Research

We study how occupation-related material interest affects environmental voting. Specifically, material interest hinges on the greenness vs. brownness of individual occupational profiles. That is, on the extent to which individuals are expected to benefit vs. lose in a greener economy. We employ individual-level data from 14 western European countries, over 2010-2019. To measure the greenness and brownness of occupational profiles, for each individual we compute predicted greenness and brownness scores based on the predicted probabilities to be employed in each possible occupation. These probabilities are combined with occupation-specific greenness and brownness scores. Individuals characterized by higher predicted brownness are less likely to vote for Green parties and for parties with a more environmentalist agenda, while the opposite holds for individuals characterized by higher predicted greenness. Voting preferences of brown profiles tend to converge towards those of greener profiles in regions that are better placed to gain from the green transition.

Organized criminal groups seek to influence political institutions and redirect public resources towards sectors they can exploit. When new opportunities for rent extraction emerge, however, do these groups pressure politicians already in office or intervene to shape who is elected? We argue that this choice depends on when new economic opportunities arise relative to the electoral cycle. We develop a theoretical framework in which criminal groups can use violence before elections to affect political selection or after elections to intimidate incumbents. We test the model's predictions in Italian municipalities, using earthquakes as exogenous shocks to local economic opportunities and data on violence against politicians between 2010 and 2020. Earthquake exposure increases both the frequency and severity of violence. Crucially, shocks occurring after elections increase post-electoral violence, whereas shocks arising close to the next election shift violence toward the pre-electoral period, without increasing violence after the election.

Policies expanding police discretionary authority are widespread and politically contested, yet their effects on police behaviour, institutional trust, and political preferences remain poorly understood. We study Britain’s 2014 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which authorised local councils to implement Public Space Protection Orders (PSPOs), prohibiting broadly defined anti-social activities and expanding officer discretion in designated areas. Using the first comprehensive dataset on PSPO implementation across London census tracts (2016–2024), linked to crime records, stop-and-search data, and electoral outcomes, we exploit PSPOs’ staggered adoption to identify causal effects. These policies increase unproductive police stop-and-search activity, disproportionately targeting non-white residents. Reported anti-social behaviour and other crimes remain unaffected. These findings suggest that vaguely defined discretionary enforcement tools can generate racially unequal policing without delivering the public order benefits that justify their adoption.