Research

We study how occupation-related material interest affects environmental voting. Specifically, material interest hinges on the greenness vs. brownness of individual occupational profiles. That is, on the extent to which individuals are expected to benefit vs. lose in a greener economy. We employ individual-level data from 14 western European countries, over 2010-2019. To measure the greenness and brownness of occupational profiles, for each individual we compute predicted greenness and brownness scores based on the predicted probabilities to be employed in each possible occupation. These probabilities are combined with occupation-specific greenness and brownness scores. Individuals characterized by higher predicted brownness are less likely to vote for Green parties and for parties with a more environmentalist agenda, while the opposite holds for individuals characterized by higher predicted greenness. Voting preferences of brown profiles tend to converge towards those of greener profiles in regions that are better placed to gain from the green transition.

Organized criminal groups seek to establish close ties with political institutions to influence public policy and redirect public resources toward sectors they can exploit. Yet, when and how do these organizations resort to violence against politicians? We address this question in the context of Italian municipalities and argue that this decision is shaped by the availability and timing of economic rents. We develop a theoretical framework in which criminal groups can engage in violence both before the election, to affect the result, and after the election, to intimidate the winner. We test the model’s predictions using earthquakes as exogenous shocks to municipal resources. Drawing on data on violent episodes against politicians between 2010 and 2020, our estimates show that these shocks lead to more frequent and severe violence, with the timing of the violence systematically shifting across the electoral cycle.